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Abstract 
The thesis examines to what extent dominant undertakings, within the evolving 
technology industry, are considered to use an anti-competitive conduct when 
strategically combining technical tying and different patent combinations. Such 
conduct may result in leveraging a position from one product market to another, 
leading to evergreening and possible abuse of such dominant position, in 
accordance to Article 102 TFEU. The EU patent system, is becoming more 
centralized, and may contribute to a better-balanced cooperation between 
competition law and patent law. The US perspective is considered in order to 
discuss whether potential guidance is needed within the EU legal assessment.  
 
Keywords: Article 102 TFEU, anti-competitive effect, technical tying, strategic 
patenting, complex patent combinations, evergreening, technology industry 
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Summary 
Technical tying refers to products, which are interrelated by their technical design 
in order to function in conjunction. On the one hand, if there is a natural and 
commercial link between the different components technical tying may enhance 
efficiency, reduce transaction costs and create savings in production and 
distribution, leading to a superior performance. On the other hand, if dominant 
undertakings tie products that are distinctive, it is likely to lead to an abuse falling 
under Article 102(d) TFEU. However, distinctive products are difficult to establish 
since the technology is constantly evolving.  
The technology industry is growing and single products increasingly consist of 
different technical components, with cumulative inventions provided for in 
different claims or sub combinations of claims, which have to fulfill the unity 
criteria to be patentable. The difficulty occurs when the unity criteria are fulfilled, 
but the combination of products may be regarded as two separate product markets. 
Two different products consisting of the same patent is mostly regarded as one 
product since the link between the products is so strong. However, where follow-on 
patents play a part, a tie between two separately patented products may result in 
attempts to extend the protection of the patent and lead to evergreening. A tie 
between one patented and one unpatented product may result in leveraging of a 
dominant position on the market. Such conduct may be regarded anti-competitive in 
accordance to Article 102 (d) TFEU in certain situations, for example: where the 
combination of two separate products is not in accordance to commercial usage on 
the market, where the consumer is coerced into buying the products, or where an 
undertaking uses its dominant position in the tied market to preserve ancillary 
activity.  
An evolving technology industry and the technical integration of complex 
structures entail difficulties to detect an undertaking’s abusive behavior. It is not for 
an undertaking to decide on the period of the patent protection or to take it all, i.e. 
to foreclose competitors and obstruct competition on the market. The US 
perspective shows a different and more developed picture, which prohibits 
dominant undertakings to use tying arrangements of patented and unpatented 
products.  
In technical tying arrangements a cautious assessments of the separate products has 
to be done especially since the technology industry is constantly evolving. 
Assessment for anti-competitive behavior must be directed to the complex technical 
functions. Additionally, cooperation between the new European Patent Court and 
the Court of Justice of the European Union could established and maintain a 
balance between competitors and undertakings. 
 3 
Preface  
This thesis indicates the finishing point of my master studies in European Business 
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inspired me to find a subject that really interested me. Although I had competence 
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When I read the new Nestle, Nespresso case1 with the attempt to rely on 
surrounding patents when the patents of the capsules had expired. I immediately 
thought about a connection to the Microsoft case2 being the step-in-stone of 
technical tying with its technological complexity. I questioned whether technical 
tying of products is to be regarded as innovative in the sense of a new product or 
only strategical in order to gain a better position and foreclose competitors to enter 
the market.3 It also rose the question to what extent such strategic use could be 
considered anti-competitive.  
Furthermore, it was the technology industry that attracted me the most, since it is 
constantly evolving which, makes it really difficult to distinguish what is a product. 
The support and confidential encouragement that Professor Hans Henrik Lidgard 
gave me to develop my thesis is something I am extremely thankful for. I would 
also like to thank him for his patience with all the different ideas I wanted to 
include before I reached the final content of this thesis. 
 
Lund August 2013 
Siri Silvereke  
                                                
1 The High Court of Justice UK, Case No: Hc12d02673 Nestlé Nespresso v. Dualit limited, 
Chancery division, Patents Court, 22 April 2013, with other national litigations in different MS. 
2 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission [2007] ECR II-3601. 
3 H K S Schmidt, ‘Competition Law and Innovation: Technological Integration’, in Steven 
Anderman and Ariel Ezrachi (eds) Intellectual property and competition law: new frontiers (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) p 207. 
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Abbreviations 
AG Advocate General 
CJEU Court of Justice of the European Union 
EPC European Patent Convention 
EPO European Patent Office 
EU European Union  
IP Intellectual Property 
IPRs Intellectual Property Rights 
OJ Official Journal of the European Union 
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SME  Small and Medium sized Enterprises  
TEU  Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
The technology industry is based on combinations of patents within a rapidly 
evolving development, which results in interlinked products of complex structures. 
The mobile phone industry is a clear example of a development, in which the 
mobile phone is now interlinked with add-on features like music player, camera, 
music device, and Internet browser.4 Technical tying is used to provide such an 
attachment, with products that are integrated and sometimes combined in a natural 
relation.5 Such integration of products should be given a greater consideration 
before a legal doctrine is further developed.6 
Technical tying could be regarded as a normal feature in commerce, and not at all 
suspicious from a competition point of view;7 patents protecting the product in such 
complex structures could also be looked upon as essential instruments for 
promoting innovation.8 The issue occurs when these two areas are combined, and 
when legal strategies are included as part of such complex product systems.9 
When dominant undertakings apply this kind of structure of combination to extend 
the dominant position and the exclusivity given through patents, it may on the one 
hand lead to an evergreening stage for the main product at stake.10 It may however 
on the other hand, with technical tying involved, provide an extended market 
position, leading to increased sales, which may even eliminate competitors.11 Many 
questions occur with such an invisible line between the necessary protections of an 
invention with attached or improvement patents,12 and a complex abused system 
leading to an enhanced command over ownership, control and knowledge, which in 
turn may hinder the competition on the market.13  
                                                
4 H K Skytte Schmidt, A comparative analyses of EC competition and US antitrust approaches to 
tying with special reference to economic thinking and intellectual property rights (PhD thesis, 
Department of Law, University of Essex, October, 2008) p 2. 
5 S Bishop and P Marsden, ‘Editorial The Article 82 Discussion paper: A missed opportunity’ 
[2006] European Competition Journal, April, p 2. 
6 H K S Schmidt (n 3) p 187. 
7 R Which and D Bailey, Competition law (7th edn, Oxford University Press 2012) p 689. 
8 Green Paper on the Community patent, and the patent system in Europe COM (97) 314, final 
24.06.1997, Communication from the Commission p 6. 
9 The study uses “technology industry” which is commonly used in EU; in the US discussions the 
concept of ”technological industry” is used with the same meaning. 
10 J R Thomas, ‘Patent “Evergreening”: Issues in Innovation and Competition’ (2009) November 13, 
Congressional Research Service, p 7. 
11 S Bishop and P Marsden (n 5). 
12 J R Thomas (n 10) p 1. 
13 G Tritton, R Davis, M Edenborough, J Graham, S Malynicz and A Roughton, Intellectual property 
in Europe (3rd edn, Thomson/Sweet & Maxwell 2008) pp 3-4. 
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1.2 Purpose 
The purpose of this study is to examine to what extent dominant undertakings may 
be considered, according to EU legislation, to use an anti-competitive conduct, 
when using technical tying of products in combination with patents as well as the 
effects it may have on the EU market. 
1.3 Method and Material  
The material will be analyzed through the traditional legal dogmatic method 
signifying that it will be evaluated and balanced to understand the law as it is, in 
relation to the purpose provided for. Traditional legal sources will be used, such as 
EU treaties, the US code, relevant case law, guidelines, commentaries, but also 
articles from scholars providing legal opinions or ideas from both EU and US. 
The different legal areas of competition law and patent law will be compared and 
analyzed together, since both have the common objectives to promote innovation. 
Technical tying of products on the market and European patent protections will be 
balanced with the pro- and anti-competitive effects on the EU market in order to 
understand to what extent such attempt to reach evergreening may be regarded as 
anti-competitive.  
The US perspective will provide similarities and differences and will be weighted 
against EU legal issues in order to clarify the effect the conduct of an undertaking 
may have on the EU market; both the way of balancing patents and competition and 
the assessment of such conduct made by the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU) will be taken into consideration.  
For the purpose of this thesis, the assumption is that follow-on patents or 
improvements is made by the same undertaking; it would otherwise require an 
profound reasoning around licensing of (Intellectual Property) IP which would be 
subject for a different thesis. 
Antitrust law, being the US terminology will be used as a synonym to competition 
law in the EU terminology. Integrated, interlinked, interrelated are words that will 
be used as synonyms when discussing products. Patent structures will indicate the 
structure within an individual patent grant and its complementary follow-on patents 
but also technical integration with interlinked products.  
The relevant EU legislation and case law from the CJEU will be analyzed to the 
necessary extent to deliver a clear picture. The cases will be chosen in accordance 
to the legal significance that they have had for the development of the legal issues. 
Articles and publications by various legal scholars and practitioners within EU and 
US will be studied to provide a better understanding of the legal issue. Articles will 
be chosen on relevant subjects but also through selection of authors by academic 
reputation, as well as by different ways of discussing and balancing technical tying 
with anti-competitive behavior and considering evergreening in relation to patents. 
Some material from the pharmaceutical industry will also be assessed when 
discussing the use of incremental innovation of patents since there is no 
fundamental difference between the pharmaceutical industry and other technology 
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industries in this area.14 This input will finally be weighted and balanced in the 
analysis in order to fulfill the purpose.  
1.4 Delimitation 
The purpose is limited to focus only on dominant undertakings i.e. undertakings 
considered to have a dominant position on the market. Small and medium sized 
enterprises (SME’s) are not considered since it would involve a different analytical 
approach. SME’s do not, to the same extent, rely on tying of products because of 
their limited market power within competitive markets.15  
Patent strategies and its process within the R&D will not be considered. The focus 
rather lies within strategic patenting i.e. from the patent application of different 
interlinked combinations to the effect it may have on the market in combination 
with technical tying. This means as well that an economic approach will be very 
limited; appears only in discussions of efficiency with no focus attached to it. 
Licensing of patents and commercial transaction of patents will not be taken into 
consideration since it would provide a too great enlargement of this thesis. 
Since the tying assessment is similar under both the Clayton Act16 and the Sherman 
Act,17 and the latter is more used within the US courts assessment the thesis will not 
consider the Clayton Act. 
As for the registration of patents, the procedure of such arrangement with 
fraudulent applications, or the providing of misleading information will not be 
considered. What matters an undertaking chooses to patent, or let remain as trade 
secrets, will not be considered. 
Since the main focus will be on EU legislation, the TRIPS agreement will not be 
considered in relation to either the EU or the US approach. The US chapter will not 
function as a comparative study, since it only highlights the most important aspects 
taken up in chapters 2 and 3. The US approach will only be used in order to give a 
better understanding of the EU legal system or even to provide a potential guidance.  
1.5 Disposition 
The following section 1.6 has been added to provide a better understanding of the 
interaction between the two different legal areas i.e. technical tying and strategic 
patenting within complex combinations of patents.  
Chapter two will provide an initial objective description to technical tying. 
Technical tying will be approached from an objective point of view providing both 
                                                
14 Response to the Commissions preliminary report, ‘EU Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry report final, 
Reference 39514, 29.01.2009 European Commission, Directorate General for Competition, p 2. 
15 Communication from the Commission — Guidance on the Commission's enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, OJ 
[2009] OJ C 45/02, para 51. 
16 Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 
17 S Frattaroli , ‘Dodging the bullit again: Microsoft III’s reformulation of the foremost 
technological tying doctrine’ (2010) vol 90 (4) August Boston University Law Review, p 4. 
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positive and negative aspects. The anti-competitive effects of technical tying will be 
considered in accordance to the aim of Article 102 of the Treaty of the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU). The different steps of assessing the anti-
competitive behavior will be highlighted with support of relevant case law. The 
close link between dominance and abuse will be discussed through the leveraging 
theory that will serve as a basis for the analysis.  
The third chapter will present a legal background of the EU legal framework for the 
patent protection and the risk of evergreening through different combination of 
patents. The unity criteria of inventions will play an important role when discussing 
the different alternatives of patent applications for cumulative inventions or follow-
on applications of patents. It will highlight the negative aspects of such complex 
technological systems, where strategic attempts by undertakings may make it 
possible to extend such protection, which in turn may lead to an evergreening stage 
leading to anti-competitive effect for the market. 
The forth chapter will provide an explanatory guidance to the US legal order 
concerning the most important aspects of chapter two and three. It will provide the 
US definition of technical tying and the Supreme Court’s antitrust assessment of the 
cases, the US leverage concern, the patent protection, and finally the US patent 
misuse doctrine.  
The analysis of chapter five will provide a weighted and balanced discussion, based 
on chapters two and three, considering the possible complexity within the 
technological structures, which can, when tying practice is involved, lead to an anti-
competitive behavior. The US chapter will then be taken into account to regard the 
differences and similarities between the two legal systems, which will further lead 
to a discussion on potential improvement of the EU and CJEU’s assessment of 
technological tying and complex patent systems combined.  
The conclusion will be given in the final chapter six.  
1.6 Interaction of Technical Tying and 
Patents 
Patents and technical tying are two different legal areas. Interesting is to investigate 
when these two legal areas are combined in an abusive way and to what extent the 
combination would eliminate the competition within the EU internal market. It is 
particularly interesting since the technology industry is a fast evolving industry 
with difficult technical features, which make it possible for dominant undertakings 
to rely on either surrounding patents or technical solutions provided with technical 
tying. The more strategically, technically tied products the easier the ways of 
relying on surrounding, or even overlapping patent protection, which poses the 
question of the title: The winner takes it all? 
Within an evolving industry, where technical tying arrangements promote 
efficiency, and different patent combinations, encourage innovation, undertakings 
may provide a web of hindrance for the entry of competitors. The definition of the 
separate products may rapidly change, which provides a possibility for an 
undertaking to tie separate product, and make it more difficult for competitors to 
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enter. An example could be a complex system where one unpatented product tied 
together with a patented product would be able to increase the position of the 
undertaking of the unpatented product leveraging the market power. 
Furthermore, incremental innovations, with follow-on applications to former 
inventions, would make it possible for the undertaking to keep its position for a 
longer period of time. The winner who can take it all would thereby signify a 
dominant undertaking, controlling the market and its competition, which, in turn 
would result in an internal market where dominant undertakings would be able to 
determine the market conditions and prices or control production or distribution.18 
It further leads to questioning the bridge between the interaction between patent law 
and competition law. Should the separate product assessment within competition 
law still be applicable for these kinds of combinations in the complexity of the 
technology industry? And can the US way of dealing with such issues give certain 
guidance to the EU system? 
                                                
18 Case C 27/76 United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal B V v. Commission of the 
European Communities [1978] ECR 207 p 217. 
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2 Technical Tying and Anti-
competitive Effects  
The intention of technical tying is to create a single product out of different 
technical integrations of products. Because of the growing technology industry 
technical tying is also increasingly involved.19 Technical tying may have different 
effect upon the market. Since a technical tying arrangement offers new ad-on 
features, it may contribute to new products on the market. Even if it may be 
considered anti-competitive in certain circumstances, such combinations of two 
products may also be beneficial for the consumers, creating efficiency on the 
market.20  
EU Competition law is intended to help preserve competition. An undertaking with 
a dominant position on the market is entitled to compete, however, with the 
responsibility not to hinder effective competition on the market by making it too 
difficult for its competitors.21 The legal monopoly, which occurs from a granted 
patent protection, has earlier been seen to coincide with the market power. An 
improvement has been done, and now more attention is given to the assessment of 
the market power associated with the Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). Although 
the protection has increased, IP owners have developed new and more aggressive 
commercial strategies to exploit their IPRs.22  
2.1 Technical Tying as a Contribution to 
the Market 
Tying refers to situations, where the customers that purchase the main product, the 
tying product are required to purchase also another product, the tied product, which 
is attached to the main product.23 Technical tying refers to the technical design of 
the product, containing different components, which are tied together to one single 
product.24 In this regard, it is impossible to purchase the tied product without the 
tying product since the two products are technically integrated.25 Such integration 
may provide that the product only works properly with the tied product and not 
with alternative products from other competitors.26 An illustrative example would 
be the computer game consoles, where the game only operates with a specific 
                                                
19 D W Hull, ‘Tying: a transatlantic perspective’ in Philip Marsden (ed) Handbook of Research in 
Trans-Atlantic Antitrust (Edward Elgar publishing limited 2006) p 287. 
20 H K S Schmidt (n 3) p 187. 
21 Behavior in Competition - A Guide to Competition, F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd, February 2010, p 
13, www.roche.com/behaviour_in_competition.pdf, accessed 7 April 2013. 
22 S Anderman, ‘The IP and competition interface: new development’ in Steven Anderman and Ariel 
Ezrachi (eds) Intellectual property and competition law: new frontiers (Oxford University Press, 
2011) p 5. 
23 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15), para 48. 
24 Ibid para 48, footnote 2. 
25 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 690. 
26 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 48 footnoot 2. 
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console. It may be used to promote efficiency to the consumer, since it leads to 
higher sales of consoles and therefore lower prices overall. But it may also, in 
certain circumstances, provide a foreclosure effect on the market, where an 
undertaking due to its market power would be able to raise barriers to market entry 
for its competitors.27 
Even though Article 102(2)(d) TFEU28 does not explicitly mention tying, it is 
regarded as the legal basis under which tying practices may be caught for abusive 
conduct.29 In case Tetra Pak v. Commission, the commission found that Tetra Pak 
abused its dominant position in the markets for aseptic machines and cartons 
intended for packaging liquid food in EU. The case established that unlawful tying 
with products connected by commercial usage could still fall under article 102 
TFEU.30 
2.1.1 Technical Tying Enhancing Efficiency 
Dominant undertakings engaged in technical tying could, in certain situations, be 
regarded to enhance efficiency on the market.31 The different components, which 
are combined or integrated to one product, may result in an economic efficiency, 
lower production and distribution costs, but also quality improvements. It would 
moreover be beneficial for the consumers with the lower process and better quality 
as a result of effective competition.32 But also cost saving in production or 
distribution, which in turn would benefit consumers.33  
Combining of products may create efficiency on the market.34 Tying may in this 
regard reduce transaction costs for customers since the product does not need to be 
bought separately and ensemble by the consumer. When buying shoes for example 
a consumer would not want to buy the shoes and the shoelaces separately.35 Since 
consumer protection is an important aspect, and may cause the liability of an 
undertaking the consumer protection also lies within the responsibility of an 
undertaking. However the responsibility is only to a certain extent since 
undertakings cannot be responsible for something that can be created in other ways 
for example consumer health.36 If not, the responsibility would lead to letting 
undertakings decide which competitors to eliminate from the market because of 
their dangerous or inferior products.37  
                                                
27 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 690. 
28 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, C 115/47 Article 
102(d) ‘… making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of 
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial usage, have no 
connection with the subject of such contracts’. 
29 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 691. 
30 Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission (TetraPak II) [1996] ECR I-5951, 
[1997] 4 CMLR 662, para 37. 
31 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 692. 
32 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 20. 
33 Ibid para 6. 
34 Ibid. 
35 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 692. 
36 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission (Tetra Pak I) [1994] ECR II-755, paras 
83 and 84. 
37 Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission [1991] ECR II-1439, para 118. 
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Even though technical tying may contribute to efficiency on the internal market,38 
technical tying as non-pricing practices may nevertheless have anti-competitive 
effect in accordance to Article 102 TFEU.39,40 Such anti-competitive behavior 
occurs when a dominant undertaking engaged in tying, abuses its market power to 
foreclose the competition from the market.41  
2.2 Anti-competitive Effects of Technical 
Tying  
The anti-competitive effect for technical tying has to be considered from the aim of 
competition law, which is to protect the interest of the competitors or of the 
consumers but at the same time protect the structure of the market, which in turn 
adds up in a protection of the competition as such.42 It can further be regarded as a 
general aim for both Article 101 TFEU43 and Article 102 TFEU.44  
Tying increases the risk that the market suffers from less competition. It may also 
lead to higher prices for the costumers if there are not sufficient customers, who 
will buy the tied product alone.45 If the undertaking is dominant in the tying market 
and forecloses the markets from similar products, such conduct may harm the 
consumer,46 reduce the availability of products on the tied market and make entry to 
the tying market more difficult.47  
No explicit guidance is given to the responsibility of dominant undertaking since it 
is to be considered in the light of ‘the specific circumstances of each case, which 
shows a weakened competitive situation’.48 However there are four criteria assessed 
by the CJEU, necessary to fulfill, for a conduct to amount to abuse in accordance to 
Article 102 TFEU:49  
1. the tying and the tied products have to be regarded as two separate 
product,  
2. the consumers must be coerced into buying the tied product,  
3. the undertaking concerned has to be dominant in the market for the 
tying product, and  
4. the practice has to provide a foreclosure of competition.50 
                                                
38 See the above Section 2.1.1 on p 11. 
39 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (n 28). 
40 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 681. 
41 Ibid p 690. 
42 C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline Services and Others v. Commission and Others, Joined Cases C‑
501/06 P, C-513/06 P, C-515/06 P and C‑519/06 P, para 63, [2009] [I-09291]. 
43 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (n 28). 
44 T Käseberg, ‘Intellectual property, Antitrust and Cumulative innovation in the EU and the US’ 
(2012) vol 1 in the series Hart Studies in Competition Law, Oxford and Portland Oregon, p 37. 
45 Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 55. 
46 Ibid para 49. 
47 Ibid para 58. 
48 Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission (n 30) para 24. 
49 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 869. 
50 Ibid para 842. 
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Leveraging which is not a criteria assessed by the CJEU, it is rather a strategic 
practice where tying may be used by an undertaking to leverage its position from 
one market to another and will be discussed as an anti-competitive effect in this 
chapter. 
2.2.1 Separate Products 
In order to be considered an abuse, the tying practice has to consist of two separate 
products and such practice has to lead to an anticompetitive foreclosure.51 Separate 
products are considered when the different products can be purchased individually, 
however such determination is not always easy,52 especially not when the definition 
and perceptions are constantly changing.53 Products that appear to be separate 
products one day may the next day be regarded as forming one single product.54  
In order to have a possible technical tying practice and not fall under 102(d) 
TFEU55 the different components in the product has to be connected by a natural 
link. When such technical integration exists, the product could consist of different 
products as long as the natural link and a commercial usage exist.56,57 The 
integration must include ‘nature or according to commercial usage’.58 However, 
this rule cannot be considered absolute since it may be objectively justified.59 In 
such circumstances, the integration has to offer something more,60 something which 
creates technical efficiencies, which leads to a superior technical product 
performance.61 
When making this assessment the attention is directed towards the market 
definition, which has been narrowed by the CJEU leading to a lower threshold to 
constitute an illegal tie.62 The stand-alone production plays also an important 
feature when discussing the distinctive product, where a production for both the 
tied product and the tying product has to exist. 63 In the Hilti case, Hilti argued for 
having one market, where the Commission found three markets, the nail gun, side 
nails and cartridge strips on the grounds that the products were produced with 
different technologies and often by different undertakings.64 
                                                
51 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 50. 
52 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 692. 
53 Ibid p 692. 
54 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 913. 
55 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (n 28). 
56Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2), para 942. 
57 C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission (n 30) para 37. 
58 Ibid para 37. 
59 Ibid. 
60 H K S Schmidt (n 3) p 206. 
61Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 1159. 
62 H K S Schmidt (n 3) p 190. 
63 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 51. 
64 Commission decision Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti, IV/30.787 and 31.488, 22 December 1987, para 55. 
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2.2.2 Consumers Coerced into Buying 
Furthermore Article 102(2) TFEU suggests that costumers have to be coerced into 
acquire the tied product for it to amount to an abuse of tying arrangement.65  
In case, a technical integration restricts the consumers’ choice, it may be regarded 
as anti-competitive,66 in the sense where the consumer, in absence of tying, would 
rather purchase the tying product without also buying the tied product from the 
same supplier.67 In this regard, if the products are considered distinctive, the 
consumers would be regarded to lose their freedom to combine products from 
different undertakings, who in turn would prevent competitors to sell competing 
product.68 In the Hilti case, where the nailcartriges and the nailgun were considered 
distinct products,69 the consumer, who would not purchase a nailgun without 
compatible nails, would still want to have the option to buy the nail cartridges 
separately.70 The same was considered in the case Microsoft v. Commission, where 
the consumers would wish to obtain the Windows Media Player (WMP), 
separately, which was included into the PC operating system from a different 
source.71 The Microsoft case concerned two abuses of Article 102 TFEU: the 
refusal to supply information to competitors and the tying of Windows media 
player to its operating software. 
It must also be assessed whether the consumers were restricted from purchasing the 
tied product separately from the tying practice. The patented cartridge stripes was 
conditional upon the complement nails constituted an abuse of dominant position, 
since it left the consumers with no choice over the source of nails, which led to 
excluding independent nail makers from the market.72 A similar argument was 
concluded in the case Tetra Pak v. Commission, where the tied sale of filling 
machines and cartons could not be regarded to be in accordance with commercial 
usage, since it deprives consumers of choice. Furthermore, usage, in a normal 
situation considered acceptable, cannot be accepted when the competition on the 
market is already restricted.73 
2.2.3 Dominance 
Article 102 TFEU is applicable to a dominant undertaking’s unilateral behavior that 
infringes the fair competition on the market.74 The provision is directed towards 
actions by undertakings, which may cause direct damage to the consumers but also 
may be detrimental to them through the impact of the effective competition 
structure. Abuse of such a position would therefore occur if a dominant undertaking 
stretches its dominant position so that  
                                                
65 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 694. 
66 H K S Schmidt (n 3) p 207. 
67 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 51. 
68 Case T-30/89 Hilti v. Commission (n 37) para 68. 
69 Ibid para 67. 
70 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 920. 
71 Ibid para 922. 
72 EU Microsoft Commission decision comp /C-3/39.530[2009] OJ C242/20, para 75. 
73 Case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v. Commission (n 36) para 137. 
74 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 683. 
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‘…the degree of dominance reached substantially fetters competition 
i.e. that only undertakings remain in the market whose behavior 
depends on the dominant one.’75  
Dominance has been defined under the Community law as a position of economic 
strength enjoyed by an undertaking, which gives the undertaking the power to 
behave independently of its competitors, and ultimately of consumers.76 The higher 
the market share and the longer the period of time, the more likely a dominant 
position.77  
For the Commission to take action under Article 102 TFEU the undertaking has to 
be dominant in the tying market, but it is not necessary to have a dominant position 
in the tied market.78 
In the Tetra Pak II case, the CJEU concluded that dominance in the tying market 
could affect the tied neighbor market because of the associative links between the 
two markets. It further means that existing customers in one market would most 
likely be customers in the other market.79  
Dominant undertakings have to be careful not to exclude competitors on other 
merits than on fair competition with products or services,80 to avoid that the market 
share plays the role to determine the prices or to control the production or 
distribution.81 And they have a special responsibility not to allow their conduct to 
impair genuine undistorted competition on the common market.82 In the Microsoft 
case the attempt to tie the web browser Internet Explorer to its dominant operating 
system Windows, ‘infringed the EC Treaty rules on abuse of a dominant position’ 
and ‘distort[ed] competition on the merits between competing web browsers.’83 
2.2.4 Foreclosure of Competitors 
The definition of anti-competitive foreclosure indicates situations, where the 
dominant undertaking is likely to be in a position to increase prices profitably as a 
result of its conduct and could therefore hamper or eliminate effective access of 
actual or potential competitors to the market.84 
According to the Commission, if the dominant undertaking has had a strategically 
long-lasting technical tying, it would indicate a significantly higher risk of 
foreclosure of the market. In this regard it is specifically important to mention that 
                                                
75 Case 6/72 Europemballage and Continental Can v. Commission [1973] ECR 215, para 26. 
76 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 20. 
77 Ibid para 15. 
78 Ibid para 50, footnote 3. 
79 C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission (n 30) para 29.  
80 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 20. 
81 Case United Brands C-27/76 (n 17) p 217. 
82 Case 322/81 Michelin v. Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para 57. 
83 European Commission, Press Release, Antitrust: Commission Confirms Sending a Statement of 
Objections to Microsoft on the Tying of Internet Explorer to Windows (Jan. 17, 2009) 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/15, accessed 15 April, 2013. 
84 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 19. 
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technical tying may reduce the opportunity of resale of individual components and 
would be too costly to reverse.85  
Tying may also have a potential effect to foreclose competition, in the sense that an 
effective competition structure is put at risk, since, for example, the tying of WMP 
reduced the consumers’ choice, which provides that potential media encoding and 
management software but also client PC operating systems would create a serious 
risk of foreclosure for competitors.86 
Normally, the Commission will take action in situations, where a dominant 
undertaking has tied products that are distinctive, and when the tying practice is 
likely to lead to an anti-competitive foreclosure.87 In this regard, an undertaking is 
protecting its position in the tying market, which leads to a foreclosure of the 
market.88 In turn it provides an abusive behavior since the dominant undertaking 
reserves such ancillary activity to itself in order to eliminate all competition without 
objective justification.89 It is possible for the competitors to provide direct evidence 
of the market performance of the dominant undertaking for a foreclosure conduct if 
the conduct has been in place for a sufficient period of time. Further evidence may 
be shown from differences in market share, marginalized or exited competitors, and 
potential competitors hindered to enter.90 
In this regard the foreclosure conduct is rather enforced to protect an undertaking 
from competitors. However it is based on consumers with the assumption that it 
would lead to a long-lasting harm to consumers, predicated upon finding of 
dominance.91 In the Microsoft case the General Court agreed with the 
Commission’s findings, that the tie led to a foreclosure of the market because of 
that the pre-installation of the media player would alter the balance of competitors 
in favor of Microsoft.92 Such marginalization of competitors would lead to that 
competitors to a dominant undertaking find it harder to make sales, and the ability 
to compete for future sales is permanently reduced.93 
2.2.5 Leveraging 
Undertakings use tying to strengthen the position in the tied product market. When 
a firm tries to strengthen its dominance to gain a position in another market it is 
called leveraging. It is considered abusive under Article 102 TFEU because 
dominant undertakings then exploit their positions to foreclose the market for 
competitors.94 
                                                
85 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 53. 
86 COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft [2005] 4 CMLR 965 (EU Microsoft I commission decision) para 
842. 
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88 Ibid para 52. 
89 Case 311/84 Centre Belge d'Etudes de Marche Telemarketing v. CLT [1985] ECR 3261, para 27. 
90 Guidance on the Commission's enforcement [2009] OJ C 45/02 (n 15) para 20. 
91 S Bishop and P Marsden (n 5) p 4. 
92 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 1034. 
93 S Bishop and P Marsden (n 5) p 3. 
94 R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 689. 
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As earlier pointed out,95 there is a close link between dominance and abuse where 
the abuse of such position is prohibited. When markets are so closely linked 
together an anti-competitive behavior in one market could affect the other market. 
It provides the risk that an undertaking might successfully be able to leverage its 
market power from one market to the other.96 A dominant position in one market 
does not imply that such undertaking should be able to leverage its position into a 
different market for the purpose of profiting.97  
Closely linked markets are in principle not possible to define since it requires a 
case-by-case assessment. Such assessment is based on the supply and demand 
structure on the market, characteristics of the products concerned. The way a 
dominant undertaking makes use of its power on the dominated market in order to 
penetrate the linked market has to be considered, as well as the market share of the 
dominant undertaking on the non-dominated market and the degree of control the 
dominant undertaking may have on the dominated market. In this regard Article 
102 TFEU should, according to Advocate General (AG) Colomer, be implied in a 
strict sense.98  
The Microsoft case is an example of leveraging where Microsoft used its dominant 
position in the PC operating system market to influence the work group server 
operating systems market.99 The leveraging behavior had a significant impact both 
on the markets for work group server operating systems and for streaming media 
players,100 which in turn created the risk that competition could be eliminated on 
that market.101 
2.3 Chapter Conclusion 
As the primary aim within competition law is to protect the interest of the 
competitors or of the consumers but at the same time to protect the structure of the 
market, the undertaking has a responsibility not to hinder effective competition. 
The technology industry is growing and technical tying is increasingly involved for 
single products made of different technical components. On the one hand, technical 
tying may enhance efficiency, reduce transaction costs and create saving in 
production and distribution, if there is a natural and commercial link between the 
different components leading to a superior performance. On the other hand, if 
dominant undertaking tie products that are distinctive, it is likely to lead to an abuse 
falling under Article 102(d) TFEU.  
For a conduct to be considered anti-competitive the tying has to consist of two 
separate products, which are difficult to distinguish in an evolving industry. There 
has to be lack of a natural link between the products. The products within the tie 
can further not be considered to be in accordance with commercial usage. The 
                                                
95  See the above Section 2.2.1 on p 13. 
96  J Langer, Tying and Bundling as a Leveraging Concern under EC Competition Law (vol 30, 
International Competition Law Series, Wolters Kluwer, 2007) p 50. 
97  R Which and D Bailey (n 7) p 689. 
98  C-333/94 P Tetra Pak v. Commission (n 30) para 57. 
99  Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 559. 
100 Case T-201/04 Microsoft Corp v. Commission (n 2) para 1290. 
101 Ibid para 1291. 
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consumers have to be coerced into buying the tied product, and distained by their 
choice. Besides it is only necessary that the undertaking have market power leading 
to a dominant position in the tied market. This dominant position has to be used in 
order for the undertaking to reserve the ancillary activity to it and thus foreclose 
actual or potential competitors on the market. Another way of abusing a dominant 
position is through leveraging its dominant strength from one product market into 
another, which may most likely occur when the markets are closely linked. A 
strategically long-lasting tying runs a higher risk of foreclosure for competitors on 
the market, leading to eliminate all competitors on the market.  
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3 Patent Protection and 
Evergreening 
The basic idea of a patent system is that the patent should not last forever but 
should function as a protection for the invention. Patent protection can be regarded 
as a reward for creative effort and a guarantee for the patentee to benefit from the 
exclusive right to use its invention of industrial manufactured products in 
circulation.102 On one hand the monopoly the patentee receives, in return for public 
disclosure of the invention, helps to promote efficiency on the market. The key 
purpose of patents is to support the creation and dissemination of products with 
new technology, by giving the patent holder a monopoly over the innovation over a 
certain period of time.103  
On the other hand, which will be discussed in the second part of this chapter, a 
patent, legally acquired but improperly used through different patent combinations, 
may lead to evergreening. This is reached through patent strategies of complex 
technology, cumulative or follow-on inventions. The complex technological 
integrated structures makes the strategies difficult to detect which in turn may lead 
to negative effects for the competition on the market,104 which may harm interests 
of investors, researchers, and competitors.105 There must therefore be a balance 
between the possibility to rely on surrounding patent and exclude competitors on 
the market.106 
3.1 Requirements for Technically 
Interlinked Patents  
Patents are an indication of encouraged investments on the market, a better 
research, and incentive for innovation, better competition, economic growth and 
consumer benefits.107 This is because the protection provides an exclusive 
protection and grants a limited monopoly in return for the disclosure of technical 
information.108 
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‘European patents shall be granted for any inventions, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and 
are susceptible of industrial application.’109  
The invention has to be compared to the state of art, which refers to  
‘…everything made available to the public by means of a written or oral 
description, by use, or in any other way, before the date of filing of the 
European patent application.’110 
The invention can further not be regarded as obvious to a person skilled in the 
art.111 Products that are technically interrelated have essential structural elements 
together. The term interrelated refers to different objects that complement each 
other or different objects that work together. An invention has to be considered 
novel of inventive nature and if it consists of a group of separately and closely 
linked inventions they have to form one single general concept.112  
3.1.1 EU Patent System Towards Centralization 
The patent system in EU is built upon a patch-work of patent registrations in 
different patent jurisdictions, which makes the protection for innovation vary from 
one Member state to another.113 The EU patent system is founded on an 
international convention, the EPC, but is not an act of community legislation.114  
The patents from the Member countries within EU are granted by a centralized 
application,115 which under the EPC is regarded to have a unitary effect.116 Such 
protection cannot be regarded as absolute since it may be curtailed in unjustified 
interference with free standing trading practice.117 CJEU has repeatedly confirmed 
their competence of taking action if it contributes to the attainment of the objectives 
of the treaties.118 An effective litigation system would therefore be essential for the 
stimulation of growth, innovation and competitiveness,119 to hinder potential forum 
shopping from the difference of established or non-established patent courts.120 
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As stated in the TFEU and within the context of the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market the European Parliament and the Council shall establish 
measures for uniform protection, coordination and supervision arrangement for 
IPRs through the Union.121 The EU protection of the internal market and the aim of 
a smooth operation, provides for a careful balance so that IPRs do not conflict with 
EU law, or alter the scope of rights that it entails.122 However, since Article 345 
TFEU123 reserves IPR and its enforcement to remain a matter of national law and 
national courts, many attempts to harmonize the systems have been made.124,125  
While the establishment of a unified patent court had been discussed earlier126 the 
agreement was not signed until February 2013.127 All the Member states had 
ratified EPC and agreed to provide for a single procedure to improve the 
enforcement of patents, as well as the defense against unfounded claims and 
patents, and to enhance legal certainty. The aim is to contribute to an integration 
process in Europe and to ensure that competition on the internal market will not be 
distorted.128 However the European Patent court shall follow the normal procedure 
for a preliminary ruling and is then obliged to refer questions of interpretation and 
question of validity of EU law,129 and CJEU will avoid deciding substantive matters 
of patentability and infringement related to EU law.130 
3.1.2 Separate or New Features Leading to Unity  
Cumulative invention is a term relating to inventions that consist of interrelated 
products. Such a technical relation may be protected through patents. The patents 
may cover the products separately but may also relate to the attachment or 
interconnection of two products.131 In this regard, the cumulative invention relies 
on previous inventions.132 However, if the product has a technical feature that 
relates to the general inventive concept, it must be stated in an independent 
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claim.133 Each claim could consist of technically added features and if these 
features are constituted to make a contribution over the prior art as a whole, and 
additionally fulfilled the unity criteria the patent may be granted.134 The 
relationship of these technically interlinked inventions shall be determined without 
regard taken to whether the claims are separate claims or alternative claims within a 
single claim.135 There are many different possibilities of claims that refer back to 
one or more independent claims, or to dependent claims or even to both.136  
To fulfill the unity requirement there must be a relation to one invention if a group 
of inventions are linked together as a form and provide for a single general 
inventive concept.137 An example hereto could be products with necessary 
connections for operation, like transmitters together with corresponding receivers, 
or plugs claimed with a corresponding socket. However, when dealing with cases 
that have combination claims such as A+B+C related to sub combinations like 
A+B, A+C, B+C or A, B, C in separate usage special attention is required by the 
examination office. In cases where the lack of unity of such invention can be 
detected, the patentability will be rejected.138 
The claim further has to be clearly, technically defined with at least one essential 
technical feature, which distinguishes it from the state of art. Even though 
considered essential, the features still have to be interrelated, either by usage of the 
product or the apparatus, or by alternative solutions, which cannot be made in a 
single claim.139 The novelty requirement can therefore be said to be dependent on 
its technical construction, which in turn is linked to the unity requirement.140 When 
amending an original patent, there is a necessity that it contains an inventive step.141  
In the context of unity and novelty requirement, Markush-grouping prevails another 
possibility for patent applications. Markush-grouping refers to a group of 
alternatives of products of similar nature that can be substituted by one another and 
be regarded as a unity of invention. It differs, from the above mentioned, 
interrelated features, since the structural element in Markush grouping does not 
need to fulfill the novelty criteria per se but in relation to the common property or 
activity. Although deriving from chemical practice, Markush grouping is now used 
for all kinds of technologies. However, when dealing with such a claim, the 
examiners assess carefully whether the structural element is shared by all of the 
alternatives.142 A single alternative put together with other combination of different 
components may also be seen as a structural element.143  
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When regarding the unity criteria is not possible to take different features belonging 
to one or both of these entities and try to piece them together in an artificial way to 
create a more relevant state of the art, but the process must also be taken into 
account.144 In this regard if the unity criteria was to interpreted too strictly, the of 
interconnection of component would not be possible, and the innovation would be 
curtailed.145 
3.2 Patent Strategies to Reach 
Evergreening 
Even though the patent system supports the creation of new technology, in 
situations, where the unity requirement would be loosened and an inventive step 
would be lowered,146 it would in turn mean that an extension of a patent protection, 
known as evergreening, would be reached.147  
Undertakings employ several kinds of strategies to find the most solid and robust 
breadth of protection for their products against competitors on the market.148 It can 
be achieved through follow-on patents, built upon an earlier invention, overlapping 
claims,149 or improvements in an attempt to reach an evergreening stage to keep 
competitors off the market.150 Such practice may disrupt the balance in the patent 
system and hinder the competition on the market.151  
As mentioned earlier, patent evergreening is mostly mentioned in the 
pharmaceutical industry, but appears also in other industries, where different types 
of technological patents are applied for.152 Patent evergreening indicates the 
intension to reach a long lasting protection through using tying in different 
combinations with patents covering various parts of the product under several 
consecutive periods.153 In this regard it is possible to benefit from such exclusive 
right and restrict others to use the protection.154  
Evergreening may, in relation to the originator undertakings, be described as an aim 
to ‘develop strategy to extend the breadth and duration of their patent protection’.155 
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It effectively leads to extension of the exclusivity of a patent protection,156 and is 
mostly used, where different technological patents for inventions or improvements 
are sought for. 157 
3.2.1 Patent Combinations Leading to 
Evergreening 
When undertakings choose to benefit from longer patent protection, patent 
strategies are usually employed in order to use the patent system for its own 
benefit.158 Such attempts are made under the R&D stage in order to maximize the 
patent protection to gain a stronger market position.159  
Within the technology industry, to result in a new invention different combination 
of components is used.160 The abuse of the patent system may take place in the 
form of follow-on-patents, or insignificant variations, that create new products on 
the market.161 Such increased patent protection may provide high concentration of 
technological space, which large and symmetric undertakings are likely to take 
advantage of by eliminating competitors.162 
The patent strategy of an undertaking may be illustrated as a toolbox, where the 
instruments may vary from company to company, and from product to product. 
However, the main function is to prevent entries of the generic products, and to 
protect the continuity of the revenue stream for the originator undertaking.163  
Follow-on-patents may be difficult to detect since they may be of complex 
structures, where the innovations are built around several, and/or previously 
complementary inventions.164 The complexity is dependent on several separate 
elements, which are separately patented; often found within the technology 
industry.165 There are different procedures with minor variations that the originator 
undertakings use in order to extend the time-period of a patent. Even though the 
variations are minor they can still be harmful to the market.166 Such variations can 
be seen as: ’… a weapon that is mainly used by large companies that want to 
protect their monopolies…’167  
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3.2.2 Evergreening Affecting the Competition 
In certain circumstances, evergreening may contribute to an anti-competitive 
behavior,168 where the patent is so broad in scope that the patent strategies lead to 
hinder competitors without pursuing innovative efforts.169  
There has to be a careful balance between patents, which encourages investment of 
imitating innovation, and dominant undertakings, which may increase their market 
power using the restriction on the IPR to hinder competitors to enter the market.170 
Competition law will only intervene in exceptional circumstances, when an 
invention has been granted a patent on an objective criterion.171 If the undertaking 
in question has a high market power, it may however enter under a dominant 
position.172 Evergreening only occurs when a patent holder employs different ways 
to abuse the legal patent system in an attempt to extend the life-cycle of a patent in 
order to maintain market dominance.173 Strategies used by undertakings with 
alternative inventions or attached inventions may in certain situations lead to patent 
claims being interpreted to reach beyond the invention, which may obstruct the 
competition on the market and result in hindering the entry of competitors.174 It 
could, further also be done by overlapping claims.175  
However, the attempt of originators to reach such evergreening stage may deter the 
innovation making it more difficult for generic undertakings to comply and 
research around the patents. Professor Sir Robin Jacob means that penalty or 
sanction ought to be introduced for companies holding invalid patent because it is 
too difficult to ‘chops the trees with a pen-knife’ and simply not efficient.176 
It is important to differentiate between the legitimate and anti-competitive use of 
the patent system. In other words ‘competition laws bite only on the exercise on the 
IPR and not on its creation.’177 
3.3 Chapter Conclusion 
The technically integrated products, which involve an inventive step and fulfill the 
unity requirement, may be regarded to promote efficiency and innovation. An 
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invention of different products has to be so closely linked to provide a single 
general inventive concept, without regard taken to separate or alternative claims, 
within a single claim or sub-combinations. The novelty requirement is then 
dependent upon the technical construction, and the essential technical feature has to 
be distinguished from the state of art. The essential, technical feature has to be 
interrelated either by usage or by alternative solutions, however Markush grouping, 
where a new component is only required to fulfill the novelty criteria in relation to 
the common property or activity of the structure. 
Within technical integration, complex structure makes it difficult to detect strategic 
use of patents. However, in case the unity criteria are to be applied too strictly, new 
interrelated technical solutions would not be possible, and too loosely applied 
would lead to evergreening, where follow-on patents would function as means to 
stretch the patentability criteria and hinder the competition on the market. An 
inventive step has to be regarded as an unexpected technical effect in order to be 
granted a patent. The different complex structure of follow-on patents or ancillary 
innovations, or product integration may lead to a minefield for competitors when 
trying to enter the market. The patent court will contribute to an integration process, 
improving the enforcement of patents and through the preliminary ruling procedure 
in order to ensure the competition on the internal market but at the same time to 
combat potential misuse in the patent system leading to a better balance. 
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4 The US Perspective 
Patent and antitrust laws are interrelated in the common purpose of promoting 
innovation and enhancing consumer welfare.178 The objective of IP law is 
considered to be ‘in the light of the presumed efficiency goal of antitrust law’.179 It 
would be a too far-reaching conclusion to consider the antitrust law superior to IP 
law they are rather complementary to eachother.180 However, to reach the 
efficiency goal a balancing of IP and antitrust law has to be made  
The incentives for innovation given by patent rights to the creators of new and 
useful products could easily be undermined, through strategic solutions, detrimental 
for the consumers. Anti-trust law prohibits actions that may harm consumers and 
the competition on the market, and upholds and promotes innovation and consumer 
welfare.181 In this regard the antitrust law only reduces the options for a patentee to 
use strategic ways to reach a stronger protection. This is important to highlight 
because, if the antitrust law only restricts the exercise of market power, the 
competitors are still left with a possibility to compete on the product market with 
strategic option to make product improvements of follow-on innovations.182  
4.1 Patents, Technical Tying and Anti-trust 
The Sherman Act §2 establishes that any person who monopolizes, or attempts to 
monopolize any part of trade and commerce shall be deemed guilty of a felony.183 
The Sherman Act was designed to prevent free and unfettered competition, and 
rests on the ideology that the competition forces, which remain unstrained, will 
yield to allocation of resources, lowest price, highest quality, and to preserve 
democratic political and social institutions.184 Furthermore, stemming from the 
Chicago school185 the promotion of consumer welfare has become an overarching 
goal of US antitrust law.186 
The antitrust analysis of patents was established through the course of patent 
infringement allegations.187 In the case ILC Peripherals Leasing v. IBM the 
integration of magnetic discs was not considered as an unlawful tying arrangement 
since the Court could not decide on product design decisions.188 After this judgment 
the aim of US antitrust law was narrowed.  
                                                
178 Case Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) p 11. 
179 T Käseberg (n 44) p 45. 
180 Ibid p 45. 
181 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property , Issued by the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, April 6, 1995. 
182 T Käseberg (n 44). 
183 Sherman act, 15 USC § 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty. 
184 Case Northern Pasific Railway Co v. United s´States, 356 US 1 at 4 (1958). 
185 The Chicago school favored free market policies and little government intervention within a 
strict, government-defined monetary regime. 
186 T Käseberg (n 44) pp 34-35. 
187 J Langer (n 96) p 67. 
188 C Ahlborn, D S Evans, and A J Padilla, ‘The antitrust economics of tying: a farewell to per se 
illegality’ (2004) Spring/Summer (49) Antitrust Bulletin, pp 295-96. 
 28 
4.1.1 Patents 
Patent protection is considered to encourage competition between different 
undertakings and promote innovation on the market.189 In this regard, patents 
should be considered private means to a public end.190 The aim is in fact to hinder 
imitation of inventions and protect the investments but also to provide the 
possibility of a reward.191 The patent functions as a grant for the patentee that 
consists of a right to exclude other from making, using, or selling the invention 
throughout the US.192 
The Patent Act provides certain criteria: a patent has to be fully disclosed in the 
application,193 the invention has to be considered novel,194 and to be regarded non 
obvious to a skilled person in that art.195 The patent could additionally consist of a 
process, a machine, or a composition of different matter, or even any new or useful 
improvement thereof.196  
To obtain a patent, regard has to be taken to the prior art.197 While assessing the 
prior art, the invention as a whole cannot be considered obvious for any person with 
ordinary skills in that art. A patent application can moreover not be rejected on the 
grounds of how it was made,198 or for unexpected results or commercial success.199 
Although it is possible to change its original proposal, since an invention could 
result in a different problem than the one, the application was anticipated for,200 
innovators should be allowed to obtain patents on improvement of inventions.201 It 
is important to note that even such improvements must follow the same criteria set 
out in the Patent Act.202 
It is important that cumulative inventions create a unity consisting of separately, but 
closely linked single general concepts.203 Within follow-on inventions the novelty 
is dependent upon its technical construction, which in turn is linked to the unity 
requirement.204 The unity criteria has to be applied strictly, however, not too strictly 
since, that could mean that the interconnection of products would be impossible to 
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achieve,205 and in turn it could, as discussed in Section 3.2.1, lead to a 
fragmentation of protection where it would cost more to get access to new 
technology.206 
An expired patent enters into the public domain leading to a public privilege to use 
and invites competitors to enter the same market.207 ‘… [A] patent is an exception 
to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to access to a free and open 
market’.208 However, attempts to use the patents improperly would have negative 
effect on the competition on the market, as mentioned above in Section 3.2.209 In 
this regard evergreening of a patentee may lead to foreclosure of competition,210 but 
only from the misuse of a patent protection and by showing that the misuse conduct 
has been abandoned the misuse may be cured and the patentee may then have all 
the rights restored.211 
4.1.2 Technical Tying and Antitrust Assessment 
Technical tying, being discussed in this thesis, refers to a technical product 
designed in order to function in conjunction with complementary products. An 
example could be a company’s the product of a camera were the body only 
functions together with the same company’s technologically tied line of lenses.212 
In the case Jefferson Parrish, it was concluded, that tying may not only constitute 
antitrust infringements, but may also be welfare enhancing.213 The consumer 
welfare is increased by its product convenience and the following increased 
functionality.214 
The product integration may constitute a greater opportunity for better protection, 
which would generate higher consumer prices and increase barriers of entry for 
other undertakings.215 However, such integration of products requires that the 
integration offers something more,216 of technical value.217 
Products from separate product markets cannot be tied together,218 because it could 
harm the competition on the market.219 The US Court reasons that attention should 
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be taken to whether components are charged separately, or whether other actors in 
the industry sell products individually or combined. Such arrangement also requires 
the consumers to be coerced to buy the tied product. The product has furthermore to 
be of such nature that the buyer would have preferred to have purchased it 
elsewhere or not have wanted it at all. When that mechanism of force is present, the 
tied item is restrained and the Sherman Act is violated.220 To reduce the risk for 
positive compliance for undertakings, market power is the key for infringement.221  
However the technological tying provided a justification in the case Jerrold 
Electronics, where the Court accepted the selling of a tied integrated system, since 
it would help to assure the effective functioning.222 Technological progress is the 
most important driver of economic growth,223 which was highlighted in the case 
United States v. Microsoft Corp. In the case Jefferson Parish it was considered 
‘The more dynamic the industry, the greater the expected error of the separate-
product test under Jefferson Parish’.224 Consequently, it does not regard the 
relationship between the two products in the tying arrangement but the character of 
demand. It cannot exist a tying when consumers are able to comprehend the two 
products being separate markets.225 The case International Salt Co., Inc. v. United 
States and the case International Business Machines Corp. v. United States clearly 
concluded that coercing the consumers was an illegal attempt to gain market 
power.226  
In order to infringe Sherman Act Section 2 the monopoly power in the relevant 
market must be distinguished from growth or development and cannot be 
dependent on a superior product.227 A patent containing exclusivity protection 
cannot confer such market power upon the patentee.228 It is not seen unlawful 
unless such business conduct is accompanied by anti-competitive elements, in order 
to protect the free-market system.229 However, monopolization or dangerous threat 
to monopolize the market is unlawful.230 Competition on the market and advantages 
acquired from the competition are therefore to be regarded as the underlying 
purpose of antitrust law.231 
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In order to infringe the Sherman Act there has to be ‘tangible harm to the 
competition’,232 since it leads to an appreciable restrain on competitors.233 Such 
appreciable restrain occurs when undertaking is able to exert power over 
competitors market.234 It requires a great caution before condemning a 
technological tie under the antitrust laws.235 An undertaking must be allowed to 
compete on the market, seek competitive advantages, make the production more 
efficient, develop complementary product, and even use different attempts to 
reduce transaction costs, without considering the market share.236 Technological 
progress indicates the introduction of new products that perform functions that 
previously required different products. Technological ties with difficult technical 
assessment requires a forward-look to the market development, which is not 
possible for a court to do, and may result in a higher risk to hurt consumer rather 
than hindering competition.237 
4.1.3 Leveraging Patents and Technical Tying  
An undertaking may extend its patents and its position on the market in different 
ways for example by improperly exploiting its patent in order to extend the patent 
monopoly or through leveraging a monopoly position. This may be regarded as an 
effective means of restraining competition in areas of unpatented supplement 
products to a patentee’s product.238 Essentially, no patent owner shall be deemed 
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of patent right by reason of sale of the patented 
product on the acquisition of a separate product, unless, in the view of the 
circumstance, the patent owner has market power in the relevant market for the 
patented product on which the sale is conditioned.239 In the Honeywell case 
monopoly leveraging was described as: 
‘… monopoly power in one market, the use of [that] power, however 
lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive 
advantage, or to destroy a competitor in another distinct market, and 
injury caused by the challenged conduct.’240 
In regard of the Sherman Act,241 the maintenance of a monopoly power and the use 
of anti-competitive conduct may be considered to violate the Sherman Act for 
leveraging concerns.242 It has to consist of a close link between the alleged illegal 
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behavior and the market power possessed by an undertaking, resulting in 
dominating or come close to dominate the neighbor market.243 The main focus of 
the US model appears in the tied market. Leverage cases only constitute an 
infringement of Sherman Act §2 if the undertaking is already dominant in the tied 
market, or if the probability of acquiring monopoly power in that tied market is 
high.244 
In the case Berkley Photo v. Eastman Kodak from 1979 the US Supreme Court 
accepted the proposition that the improper use of monopoly by leverage to 
strengthen its monopoly power in another market may lead to a violation of the 
Sherman Act §2. In this case, such a violation stemmed from an undertaking that 
used its monopoly power only to gain competitive advantage in the second market, 
even without attempts to monopolize. Kodak may therefore have violated the 
Sherman Act on the grounds that it refused to sell Berkley bulk film for use in the 
Minolta camera and gained the advantage in the other market by refusing to sell 
such the product. Furthermore, such misuse of power would be deemed illegal 
regardless of whether the monopoly would be legally or illegally acquired.245 
For an undertaking that possesses a monopoly in one market, more than the result 
of a competitive advantage in another market is required to give and to extend the 
monopoly power in leveraging.  
4.2 Chapter Conclusion 
Product integration can be an opportunity to interconnect components to new 
products which were formerly sold separate. However, if the unity criteria of 
combined components with patents of different technical value would be too 
strictly provided, it would result in decrease of innovation, and less access to new 
technology. Such integration together with technical tying may also contribute to 
higher consumer prices and barriers to enter. The US antitrust system rests on the 
ideology of free competition, and for a conduct to be regarded anticompetitive the 
technical tying has to constitute separate products also sold separately by other 
actors on the market, consumers coerced into buying, and produce a tangible harm 
to the competition, resulting in exerting powers to restrain competitors. 
Furthermore, technical tying can also infringe the Sherman Act if an undertaking 
uses its monopoly position to leverage its position into another market or even if it 
ties patented and unpatented product given that it has a dominant position in the 
patented market not caused by the patent protection. Technological tying 
additionally requires a difficult technical assessment and a forward-look to the 
market development, with the consequences that the Court risks to hurt the 
consumer rather than hinders competition.  
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5 Analysis: The Interaction 
between Patents and 
Technical Tying and its Anti-
competitive Effects  
However the European Patent court shall follow the normal procedure for a 
preliminary ruling and is then obliged to refer questions of interpretation and 
question of validity of EU law246, and CJEU will avoid deciding substantive matters 
of patentability and infringement related to EU law. 247 
The two legal areas of competition law and IP overlap with the similar intention to 
promote innovation and consumer welfare. The analysis here will assess the 
technical tying and strategic patenting to develop, first, the discussion about the 
possibility of these two legal areas in a stand-alone perspective, and second the two 
areas interaction to show whether it provides evergreening and/or foreclosure for 
competitors.  
In this regard, it is important to highlight that there are situations, where 
competition law is applied to undertakings that have misused the exercise of 
patents. However, there are also situations where the exercising was completely 
lawful and still fell under the scope of anti-competitive behavior.248 
Undertakings, with a dominant position on the market, are assumed to have a 
higher responsibility and not make it more difficult for other undertakings to enter 
the market.249 Besides, the idea of a dominant undertaking to combine technical 
tying and patent strategies would increase their power to leverage, which in turn 
could increase its dominant position, resulting in hindering competitors to enter the 
market.  
The analysis will move on to examining the two concepts of technical tying and 
strategic patenting in combination with one another. Evergreeening will be 
considered in compliance to patent extensions and the leveraging theory will be 
considered from a technical tying point of view. The effects stemming from such 
arrangements will be assessed together with the impacts of the evolving 
technological market. The result of this finding will be examined from a policy 
perspective, looking at whether the EU could learn from the way US has chosen to 
organize the balance between IPR and antitrust infringement.  
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5.1 Possibility of Technical Tying and 
Patent Complexity 
Both technical tying and complex patent integrations are important tools in order to 
promote efficiency, like the illustrative example of computer games as tying 
products and consoles as tied products cannot operate from the close technical link 
of the design, as discussed in the above Section 2.1.250 Such integration simply 
promotes efficiency on the market, since there may be a lower price over all,251 but 
also in accordance with the consumer convenience since the products do not need 
to be bought separately.252  
Even if tying arrangement for protection of the consumer leads to a better 
protection of the market,253 it does not change the fact that any abuse of a dominant 
position may still contribute to an anti-competitive behavior. The Commission’s 
approach is therefore more and more based on the anti-competitive conduct of 
undertakings.254 
Follow-on patents contain the same possibility of incentives for innovation with 
patent application protecting such advancements. It also remains essential to 
guarantee the protection of the patentee by restricting others of using the patent,255 
in order to establish the product on the market.256 The public disclosure of a 
patented product is an incentive to innovate for the undertaking, which in turn 
promotes the efficiency on the market.257 The contribution to the market also stems 
from solutions of integration of already existing inventions or even follow-on 
patents.258 If this would not be the case, there would be no future for the technology 
industry, and such a minefield of patents would make it impossible for competitors 
to enter the market. In practice the patent and the given exclusivity must balance 
the potential misuse that such a position can create.259 If an undertaking would 
extend the protection of the inventions it would obstruct of the competition on the 
market and hinder the entry of competitors; all discussed in Section 3.2 above.260  
5.2 The Impact of an Evolving Industry  
As discussed in Section 2.2 above it is difficult to determine distinctive products in 
the technology industry because the industry is constantly evolving and what 
appears one day to be separate products may the next day be regarded as forming 
one single product.261 The perception of what constitutes a product is thus 
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constantly changing both from a public and from a business perspective, depending 
on what may be understood as normal to include in a product for the comfort of 
consumers.262 The definition of the products may then constitute the interlinking of 
the different components that may form a new product.263 
The consumer plays an important role in defining the products since the consumer 
requires the choice of combining different products. If the consumer is refused such 
a choice by a tying arrangement, it constitutes distinctive products. It therefore 
depends on whom the product is directed to, how the product is produced within a 
distribution chain where the costumers would want to be able to choose from 
different products or if the customer is the end consumer who would like the 
product to only function. Competitors’ manufacturing of compatible products does 
not really hinder competition, and is therefore only illegal if it leads to a patent 
infringement.264 What remains important is the demand on the tying product 
without the tie arrangement it is clear that an integrated version may be beneficial 
for the consumer.265 To assess the supply of products, whether it is common to 
integrate in that market or in neighbor markets, may be regarded to strict. However, 
an assessment of the trends within the technology industry as the Commission did 
in the EU Microsoft case would suffice, since it shows not only the effect the 
integrated products may have on the market but it also allows for innovation and 
product development.266 
Since the evolving technology industry has grown more important, the definition of 
the products within the assessment of the CJEU, is no longer as important as before 
and bigger emphasis has been given to the market definition of the products.267  
5.3 Technical Tying and Patents in 
Dangerous Combinations  
The balance between IPR and competition law is very important268 especially when 
it comes to technical tying arrangement. The technology industry is based on 
cumulative inventions, which without a technology breakthrough would not provide 
routes for further innovations through improvements or applications.269 The 
evolving technology industry could result in changes for the definitions of what 
constitutes a product, which in turn may lead to an increased dominant position 
where competitors are foreclosed from entering the market. It is also well-known 
that too much patent protection may be just as harmful to innovation..270 A patent 
cannot normally be compromised in accordance to Article 345 TFEU. However, if 
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it generates into an abusive behavior due to the position of a dominant undertaking, 
it enters under Article 102 TFEU,271 where the abusive behavior in its entirety has 
to be regarded as restricting competition.272 Thus Article 102 TFEU also helps to 
eliminate potential failures in the patent system, in the light of competition and 
public interest.273 
5.3.1 Combining Patents in Technical Tying 
Practice  
The most complex system of combination of patents is found within the technology 
industry.274 Undertakings may try to reach a longer protection for their patents 
where an undertaking would use its freedom to combine follow-on patents and 
incremental innovations. The incentive would be to reach an evergreening stage to 
keep its competitors off the market. Choosing inventive steps makes it is easier for 
an undertaking to reach an evergreen protection.275 The more complex structures of 
previous or complementary inventions built around the basic invention, the more 
difficult it is to detect evergreening, as discussed in Section 3.2.276 
The unity requirement has an important role within the technical relationship, when 
combining different patents if there are different claims on the inventions or even 
alternative claims on a single invention.277 In this regard products protected under 
the same patent will be regarded by the competition authority as the same product 
and will therefore not infringe Article 102 TFEU.278 Products combined in patent 
structures like Markush grouping, resulting in a unity of different products within 
the same structure, can thus not be considered a tying infringement, whereas 
different minor changes of products within the structure could make it possible to 
combine new elements, incremental innovation in order to extend the protection.279  
Technical tying included into such combination could increase the spider web of 
complexity. In this regard, a minor variation that would not be harmful in another 
situation could in such a web create great harm to the market by extending the 
period for the legal monopoly of an undertaking.280  
In such complexity, regard can be taken to interlinked components as A+B+C, 
referred to earlier in Section 3.1.2 and where it may include sub-combination of the 
components like, A+B, A+C, B+C. This provides an example of what is registered 
as a first combination patent but what would happen if such combination were to be 
combined in a technical tying practice with the same kind of patent combination 
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structure?281 Components like D+E+F would constitute a new product and if D 
would be possible to combine with the component A or B or C and with E or F, it 
could lead to a very complicated web of patent combinations. The combination is 
thus not within the same patent application and could therefore be considered as 
two separate products in a tie. The tie could therefore be a strategic solution for an 
undertaking, if the patents are about to expire in the first combination of A+B+C 
series but not in B+C+D. 
For an attempt to reach an extended legal protection from a patent, the only 
possibility to reach an evergreening stage is through incremental innovations to a 
product. Strategically R&D efforts help to reach such market position.282 As 
illustrated, strategic patenting may be regarded as a toolbox of an undertaking, with 
different tools for different industries, to ensure the revenue stream, and prevent 
competitors from entering.283 However, for an undertaking to win it all, the 
technical tying together with a complex patent system could further serve as to 
remove the legal certainty and create a minefield of patents284 in order to maintain 
the market position and make the entry more difficult for competitors.285 While 
incremental inventions where sought for to extend the life-cycle of a patent, 
technical tying produced new combinations to maintain market dominance, which 
could lead to an anti-competitive behavior,286 since that web would make it 
impossible for competitors to enter, as discussed in Section 3.2.2.287  
The US Supreme Court has, in relation to different legal areas effecting different 
areas of law, discussed a theory: the butterfly effect288 where small changes in the 
initial patent conditions could result in large differences in a later stage thus causing 
effects on the competition on the market.289 
5.3.2 Combining Patented and Unpatented 
Products in Technical Tying 
The combination of an unpatented product and patented product could more easily 
lead to different product markets, if not fully integrated and thereby the tying of 
them will be considered an infringement of Article 102 TFEU.290 The US legal 
order has dominated over the combination of patents and unpatented products since 
the misuse doctrine patents.291 The US code states that patent owner who misuses 
the patents rights through sale of patented products together with separate products, 
where the owner has market power for the patented product on which the sale is 
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conditioned, may be deemed guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent 
right.292 
In EU the question is rather whether an undertaking’s attempt is to leverage its 
position from one market to another. A dominant undertaking which, is stronger in 
the market of the patented product would be able to leverage by using technical 
tying to create a stronger and even more dominant position. As the Commission has 
noted it is not necessary to have a dominant position in the tied market for being 
considered infringement of Article 102 TFEU.293 The dominant undertaking would 
then have a stronger probability of distorting the competition for the competitors 
doing business within the same industry. As was concluded in the case Microsoft, 
where the tie of the web browser Internet Explorer and the dominant operating 
system Windows led to distort competition on the merits between competing web-
browsers.294 In regard of making such a leverage work, the value of the patented 
product has a crucial role. If the patented product has such a high value so that the 
tie increases the quality of the other unpatented product, it could result in a higher 
reputation and be very beneficial for the undertaking in question.295 
The evolving technical tying contributes to the difficulty of distinguishing the 
separate products within the technical integrated system. The markets even though 
providing distinct products may be considered very closely linked which results in 
that they could easily affect one another. Undertaking applying technical tying 
could in this sense run a greater risk to leverage its position from one market to 
another.296  
A dominant position per se is not an issue; it is the actual abuse of it. It means that 
having two separate products containing different markets could lead to an anti-
competitive foreclosure.297 To have it regarded as two distinct products, the link 
between the two products has to be natural or for commercial use.298  
The determination of closely interlinked markets requires a case-by-case 
assessment. Such assessment is based on the supply and demand structure of the 
market, and the characteristics of the products concerned. However, as AG 
Colomer’s opinion states, Article 102 TFEU should in cases concerning the balance 
between IP and competition law be considered in a strict sense. The degree of 
control, because of the easy penetration through leveraging within technical tying, 
could determine a foreclosure of competitors.299 In this regard, it should be for the 
legislator to decide the correct period of protection and not for the dominant 
undertaking in question.300 
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5.3.3 The Risk for the Market 
The attempts with follow-on patents or incremental innovations, unexpected effect, 
or Markush grouping are all patent arrangements, which could lead to extending the 
patent, providing evergreening. In situations, where there is a higher risk of 
foreclosure of the market, the Commission is also more likely to take action.301 In 
such a way, the undertaking attempts to preserve the main activity to itself to 
protect its position, leading to an anti-competitive behavior in absence of an 
objective justification.302  
Since the technological advance is not the same in all fields, a one-size-fits-all 
intellectual property system simply does not function.303 
Since technical tying is tying of technical products there is automatically a link 
between the tying and the tied market. Associative markets establish that costumers 
in tying market would easily be customers in the tied market, which leads to that 
dominance in the tying market is likely to affect the tied market.304  
As discussed in Section 2.2.5, technical tying by a dominant undertaking runs a 
higher risk of eliminating the competition on the market,305 which leads to the fact 
that dominant undertakings have a higher responsibility to compete fairly on the 
internal market.306 This is because it can be considered that a market share could be 
seen as connected to the dominant position of an undertaking.307  
The balance of competition is important as mentioned in Section 2.2.4, since it 
otherwise makes it difficult for competitors to make sales in the present or even in 
the future.308 It further means that technical tying arrangement cannot be made to 
alter the balance of the competitors in favor of an undertaking.309 Technical tying 
could further mean that the technical integration is so strong that one product 
cannot work well without the tied product, produced by competitors.310 In turn this 
leads to a potential risk of less competition as mentioned in Section2.2, leading to 
higher prices,311 resulting in a reduction of products, which would compromise the 
entry for competitors.312 Such conduct may prevent competitors from bringing 
innovative goods to the market,313 and therefore not contribute to the technical 
development.314 The US approach seems to regard product integration in a different 
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way, with a more lenient and less interventionistic approach to create better 
efficiency.315  
5.4 EU on the Right Path? 
Considering the evolving technology industry, technical tying is increasingly 
growing.316 As has been shown, more attention has been given to power associated 
with IPR, which was formerly only considered to coincide with the market power. 
This is because more aggressive strategies have been developed by the 
undertakings.317  
As has been concluded, there is no real difference between technical tying and 
contractual tying in regard of the assessment made by the Court318 and does not in 
particular consider the benefits and the efficiencies that stem from the integration of 
the products.319 
Intellectual property is not the only issue to encourage innovation. Competition law 
plays an important role as well, since competing companies are more inclined to 
innovate in order to preserve or gain a better position on the market than to harm 
competitors. The Commission has emphasized the positive effect of vigorous 
competition enforcement on innovation.320 
Article 345 TFEU321 reserving IPR enforcement to national authorities, provides 
the EU protection of the internal market and the balance between IPR and 
competition law more difficult to achieve in reality.322 The unified patent Court, 
which all Member States have ratified to improve enforcement of patents, may be 
the first real attempt able to reach a balance between patent and competition law. It 
would further lead to a stronger incentive to protect the internal market, and provide 
an enhanced legal certainty, with better integration of EU.323  
5.4.1 Different Approach to the EU Assessment  
When comparing the assessment of abusive conduct between EU and US, it is of 
interest to first start with the wording of the legal codes. Article 102 TFEU clearly 
states that any abuse of a dominant undertaking is considered illegal while the 
Sherman Act states that any person who monopolizes or attempts to monopolize the 
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market will be deemed guilty of offence.324 The linguistic difference is interesting 
since the EU seems to have the stricter view and more regard an undertaking’s 
behavior than the aftermath of such behavior while the Sherman Act takes into 
regard the legal effect of such behavior for the market.  
It could be demonstrated from the Commission’s way of focusing on the economic 
effects and competition rules that its approach is more and more the anti-
competitive conduct of undertakings.325 
This can be further demonstrated in the case of British Airways, where it requires 
demonstrating that the abusive conduct of an undertaking in a dominant position 
tends to restrict the competition. As the case also clarifies, it indicates the 
capability, and the likelihood to create such effect.326  
The US on the other hand has a slightly different approach, since section §2 of the 
Sherman Act is more directed towards conduct which tends to destroy competition 
itself rather than taking regard to whether the conduct is competitive.327 Attempts to 
monopolize have therefore the higher requirement that an undertaking has to be 
considered to have a dangerous probability of monopolization.328 To restrict the 
pro-competitive effect and consumer interest, an undertaking with market power 
has to take steps incompatible with the competitive process.329 Such high demand 
on consumers’ interest provides that for the conduct to be regarded as anti-
competitive within technical tying cases, it has to affect the consumer interest under 
Sherman Act Section 2. In the four criteria mentioned in this thesis under section 
2.2 above, CJEU had not the same high demand on consumer interests and merely 
assumed that anti-competitive conduct is present when less competition is on the 
market since new product may be hindered to enter.330 On both sides of the Atlantic 
the courts suggest that a technical tying arrangement has to offer something more to 
the integration of the two products,331 which further relates to that it has to include a 
specific technical value.332 Taking the consumers into account, in cases involving 
technical ties, innovation efficiency should be an important consideration since the 
increase in quality benefits consumers more than anti-competitive effect may harm 
them.333 
The US competition would further be badly served if undertakings, which have 
managed to reach a market success of monopoly power, would be forced to ‘lie 
down and play dead’.334 In this regard the Sherman Act shall protect the process of 
competition, which stimulates undertakings to succeed and should not suppress 
monopoly itself or prevent undertakings to exercise monopoly power.335 
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Even though a consumer prefers an integrated product to just one, the case-law on 
both sides of the Atlantic proves that the question of technical tying lies within the 
two separate products. In this regard, tying as referred to in the Jefferson Parish 
case, the product has to consist of two products for it to be regarded as a tie. It is 
then of relevance to consider whether the products are integrated or could be 
regarded as two products. However, the consumer demand test is not enough here 
and a more sophisticated detailed analysis of the integration of the two products and 
the market conditions is required. It would require a better assessment of the 
product itself and to go beyond the scope of IP for the competition authority.336  
An important aspect to consider when discussing the legal doctrine of technical 
tying is the difference between the two legal systems that founded the different 
approach of tying in relation to the defense. The possibility for an undertaking to 
make a defense occurs after finding the abuse. Standard of proof is high and the 
justification has to be balanced against the anticompetitive effect it might have for 
the market.337 The US defense appears instead at the stage of assessing the two 
separate products. Even though it may be considered simpler, the US system could 
not be considered more sensitive to the benefits that technological integration can 
bring with developments and innovations.338 
5.4.2 Potential improvements  
The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition policy is not 
straightforward since there is an obvious potential for conflict between systems.339 
Since competition drives undertakings towards innovation, and if competition 
means growth, we need a well-regulated competition in the internal market to heal 
the crack in the structure.340 
The fact is that the consumer demand test can thus not work in a fast growing 
dynamic market such as technology industry.341 Great caution should be granted to 
the assessment of technological tie under anti-trust law. The key feature of 
technology progress is the introduction of new products that perform better function 
than the previous required multiple products. In this regard it may be difficult for 
the Court with complicated technical tying to see the future of business issues, 
which lead to that a wrongful assessment, may rather hurt than help the 
consumer.342 
The Microsoft case is seen as an important building block for technical tying 
doctrine to be established on. The case does not only focus on the benefit for the 
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consumers but has also the imperative issue regarding whether the integration is 
purely strategic or only innovative.343 
In line with AG, the CJEU should make a weighted balance between, on the one 
hand the interest in protecting the IPR and the economic freedom of its owner and 
on the other hand the interest in protecting free competition. However, to provide 
such balance, the protection of competition has to be considered in accordance with 
the consumer welfare.344 The Court has to be able to see the differences from a 
technical tying between beneficial integration from a consumer perspective and 
strategic exercise by an undertaking to exclude competitors. Courts shall not ignore 
difficult technical assessments in these types of cases. It is of importance that all 
aspects in a case of technical tying are to be assessed. Such argument raises the 
question whether the Court in fact is the best instance to assess technical tying in 
such integrated processes.345 
The establishment of the Patent Court, where the grants and litigation of patents 
will be centralized, may increase a better balance between anti-competitive 
enforcement and the EPO. Since there is no court dealing with both patent and anti-
competitive behavior on the market the communication and the cooperation is of 
special importance to reach a better understanding of the product and the market.346 
The referral of question from the patent court to the CJEU could provide such a co-
operation where patent question relating to competition law could be sent for a 
preliminary ruling to the CJEU. 
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6 Conclusion 
The interaction between technical tying and competition law is discussed from a 
point of view of combining patents with patented and/or with unpatented products, 
and whether and to what extent this may constitute an anti-competitive effect, 
considering also effects on the EU market and potential improvements. 
When a dominant undertaking, with a dominant position in the tying market, uses 
technical tying to combine a patented and an unpatented product, it may lead to 
anticompetitive behavior in certain described situations. If the two products are 
linked with a tie, they may be regarded as separate products, provided that they 
have different production and consumer demands on the market. The technical 
design could anyhow constitute a natural link between the products. However, the 
market definition also has to be taken into account. If the product combination is 
relatively new on the market the commercial practice does not exist, which makes it 
difficult to define such integration.  
However, if the integration may provide a superior technical performance, it may 
be accepted. The market definition, when it is narrowed by the Court, does not take 
into account the efficiency of the superior performance. The reason for this may be 
the threatening of the dominant position, since dominance and abuse are so closely 
linked. In this regard, the undertaking may be able to leverage its position from the 
market, where the undertaking is dominant to the market where it is not dominant, 
especially if the markets are closely linked. This would in turn lead to an effect both 
for the market, where competitors are eliminated and for the competitors, which are 
hindered to enter the market with new products. 
A tying combination of two different patents would be considered to follow the 
same structure as above. However it may differ when a complex patent 
combination is present. Combining two patents could lead to anti-competitive 
behavior from an evergreen perspective, since patents may provide different 
technical combinations. When tying a patented product with a new solution, or 
follow-on patents in order to extend the protection of the patent, the resulting 
product may consist of combinations like A+B+C being linked to B+D+E where 
sub combinations could increase the web of complexity. Such integration could be 
found within incremental innovations connected to an invention or even structural 
patent systems, where new features easily may be included like in Markush 
grouping. This type of attempt to extend the protection is regarded as evergreening. 
The extension may in turn provide a hinder for competitors to enter the market, 
which results in foreclosure and may enter under Article 102 TFEU. 
Market effects can be detrimental to such abusive conduct since it would alter the 
balance of competitors in favor of the undertaking. If such combination of separate 
products is made with a close technical attachment, and regarded not to be in 
compliance with commercial practice, it could mean that the products are so strong 
that neither of them would work well without the attached tied product. It would in 
turn lead to a potential risk of less competition, leading to higher prices for the 
consumers, resulting in a reduction of products on the market, and making the entry 
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for competitors very difficult. It could further prevent innovation of products and 
decrease the technical development. 
When looking at the CJEU assessment from a US perspective, changes that could 
promote competition could be suggested. Unlike the US system, the CJEU takes 
regard to the undertakings’ conduct rather than the effect such conduct has on the 
market. Considering this, it gives a clearer picture to the reason why the US 
assessment takes the efficiencies of technical integration of products into account. 
When the CJEU assesses the separate product issues in a technologically evolving 
industry, from the market considerations of a product, the innovation and the 
potential superior technical function stemming from such combinations may not be 
considered. It is moreover not possible to constitute whether the two separate, 
innovative products within the fast evolving industry is considered to be in 
accordance with commercial usage with competing undertakings. 
The question is whether EU after the establishment of the Patent Court will achieve 
a better cooperation with the EPO when dealing with technological integration of 
products. The CJEU no longer has to look into the technological future without 
having technological competence to do so. The products should therefore have to 
be assessed in accordance with the innovative prospect, in order to promote 
efficiency on the market, and leave competition to be regarded as the driver of 
economic growth. As shown in this thesis the balance between on the one side the 
patent protection and the anti-competitive behavior will have to be present. The 
question remains whether the Patent Court, to be established in EU, and the CJEU 
may have some kind of cooperation, which would lead to a better assessment of 
technology integrated products. 
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